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VOICE IDENTIFICATION, WRITING EXEMPLARS AND
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB*
The problems involved in defining the nature of the privilege against
self-incrimination and in setting its limits have been much mooted
in recent years. Though these problems have been brought into
sharp focus by the present very urgent and certainly justified con-
cern for our national security, they are problems which are inherent
in the privilege itself. They have been with us for a long time.
One of these problems concerns the extent to which a person may
refuse to participate in criminal proceedings brought against him.
Doubtless not even the most liberal proponent of the privilege would
claim that an accused person should be permitted to wear a mask
in court and refuse to reveal his face to prosecution witnesses seeking
to make an identification. Common sense rebels at the idea. On the
other hand, compelling the accused to take the stand and answer
under oath questions concerning the crime of which he is charged
or ordering him to produce a personal diary in which he has entered
incriminating matter-these are clearly violations of the privilege.
It is between these polar cases that there lie the situations which
have given our courts great difficulty. The same questions have, in
different jurisdictions, been given different and irreconcilable answers.
Can a person be made to try on clothing or to expose identifying
body markings? Is it permissible to compel an accused to submit to
a blood test to determine blood-alcohol content, or to submit to a
physical or mental examination? Can he be compelled to make
fingerprint and footprint impressions? These are only a few of the
many possible cases.
It is the purpose of this article, first to examine two situations which
are still open questions in almost every United States jurisdiction
and which seem to fall almost exactly on the border-line between
compelled conduct which violates the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and that which does not.
1. Can a person be compelled to execute an exemplar of his hand-
writing for use against him in a criminal proceeding?
2. Is it a violation of the privilege to force a suspect to speak so
that a voice identification can be attempted?
Then, after reviewing and commenting upon the case authority
in this area, some suggestions will be made concerning the proper
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John M. Maguire of Harvard Law School who read this article in manuscript
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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
limits of the privilege against self-incrimination as applied to the
compelled conduct of an accused.
HISTORY OF THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 1
Before progressing further it will be well to examine briefly the
history of the privilege against self-incrimination. A knowledge of the
history of the privilege may prove helpful in determining how to
interpret the various phrases in the federal and state constitutions
which are the present-day embodiments of the privilege.
A. The Development of the Privilege in England.
The seeds of the controversy which eventually bore as fruit the
privilege against self-incrimination were planted in the eleventh
century. William the Conqueror required the bishops, who had been
sitting as judges and presiding over suits in the popular courts, there-
after to decide cases according to ecclesiastical law.2 From this
enactment emerged two separate systems of English courts-the ec-
clesiastical courts and the common-law courts. Much of the early
history of the privilege is concerned with the struggles for power
between these two systems of courts.
The next landmark on the long road that the privilege against self-
incrimination was to travel, resulted from an innovation in the prac-
tice of the ecclesiastical courts. In the early 1200s, chiefly by the
decretals of Pope Innocent III, a new form of oath was substituted
for the old compurgation oath.3 The compurgation oath consisted of
the accused swearing his own innocence, usually in company with
oath-helpers. If this formula of innocence was successfully recited,
it served as a decision in itself in favor of the accused.
A more satisfactory procedure was introduced in the ecclesiastical
courts in the early thirteenth century. This was the inquisitorial or
interrogatory oath which pledged the accused to answer truly ques-
tions asked by the judges. The oath, no longer determinative in it-
self, now served as a means of providing the judges with material
for the rational solution of factual controversies.
There were various methods of initiating the proceedings by
which an accused might be summoned before an ecclesiastical court
and the new inquisitorial oath administered. The proceedings might
1. An elaborate presentation of the history of the privilege against self-
incrimination is beyond the scope of this article. All that is attempted here is
a setting-forth of the history sufficient to provide a background for a discussion
of the policy and suggested treatment of the privilege. Throughout this section,
citations are given to books and articles which treat the history of the privilege
in much greater detail.
2. 8 WIGMORE, EVmNCE § 2250, at 277 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as
WIGMOP).
3. Id. at 281.
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be initiated by the complaint of a lay witness, or by private prose-
cutors functioning somewhat like a grand jury. An official complaint
might be lodged. Finally, an ecclesiastical judge, by his own motion,
might summon the accused and administer the oath. This last method,
the "ex officio" oath, as it came to be called, might be administered
because there was good reason to believe, from common report, that
the accused was guilty of a specific offense. On the other hand, the
ex officio oath might serve as the weapon of a fanatic, conducting
sweeping investigations in which hundreds of persons might be
made to answer under oath questions concerning vague or unspeci-
fied charges. This latter form of the ex officio oath became very
popular in the persecution of heretics.
It was in the reigns of Elizabeth, James I and Charles I that the
ex officio proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts found their widest
and most obnoxious application.
Elizabeth, in 1558, created the Court of High Commission in
Causes Ecclesiastical. The Court of the Star Chamber, formally
created in 1487, was also activated. There followed a period of suppres-
sion of deviation from the established state religion in which the
inquisitorial oath in its most extreme ex officio form was utilized in
the ecclesiastical courts to badger, confound and convict suspected
heretics.
In the midst of this ruthless persecution, a champion appeared
to tilt against the power of the ecclesiastical courts. Sir Edward
Coke became Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in 1606 and Chief
Justice of the Kings Bench in 1613. Under his influence, it came
to be the prevailing view in the common-law courts "that the
ecclesiastical courts (including that of High Commission) could
not, as a matter of jurisdiction and procedure, put laymen to answer,
'ex-officio,' to penal charges." 4
It is important to note that at this point there was no definite
prohibition against the use of the inquisitorial oath itself, but merely
against its ex officio application. Nor was there any limitation upon
the use of the oath in the Star Chamber, which had far greater powers
than the ecclesiastical courts. And nothing at all has been said as
yet of the employment of inquisitorial procedure in the common-
law as distinguished from the ecclesiastical courts.
These final chapters in the English history of the privilege were
written after one of the most dramatic and significant events in the
annals of personal liberties.
In 1637, John Lilburn, a young member of the Leveller sect, was
arrested by order of the Star Chamber and charged with sending
heretical books from Holland to England. When brought before the
4. Id. at 289.
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court of the Star Chamber, Lilburn bravely defied that powerful
tribunal, by refusing to take the inquisitorial oath. He said, "And
withal I perceived the oath to be an oath of inquiry; and for the
lawfulness of which oath, I have no warrant; and upon these grounds I
did and do still refuse the oath."5 He also demanded that he be con-
fronted by his accusers.6 When brought before the Star Chamber
again, to be sentenced for contempt, Lilburn denied the charges
against him,7 but steadfastly refused to take the inquisitorial oath.
Lilburn was fined 500 pounds and sentenced to be whipped and to
stand in the pillory.8 The sentence was carried out in 1638.
In 1640, Lilburn petitioned parliament for his release from prison
and the petition was granted. In 1641, the House of Commons re-
solved "That reparation ought to be given to Mr. Lilburn for his
imprisonment, sufferings, and losses sustained by that illegal sen-
tence."9 The same year saw the abolition of the Star Chamber and
High Commission. In 1648, parliament voted 3,000 pounds in repa-
ration for "the extraordinary sufferings and barbarous tyranny, that
by colour of the said unjust decrees were inflicted upon the said...
John Lilburn."'10
Opinion against the inquisitorial oath had been building up slowly
over many years. The notorious Lilburn affair acted as a catalyst to
speed the process. As far as the ecclesiastical courts were concerned,
"by the end of the 1600s, professional opinion apparently settled
against the exaction of an answer under any form of procedure, in
matters of criminality or forfeiture.""
The common-law courts were also affected. In jury trials, no
oath was administered to the defendant because such an oath would
be of decisive effect. It would afford too easy a method of self-
acquittal. But though not sworn, defendants were freely questioned
at trial by the judges and pressed for answers. Accused felons were
compelled to submit to a preliminary examination by a justice of
the peace. This examination was preserved and could be used at
the trial. Compulsory self-incrimination under oath had its place in
the examination by common-law officers of persons accused of mis-
conduct during trial, or as bankrupts, Jesuits or abusers of warrants.12
Some of these practices, notably the preliminary examination of
accused felons, lingered on the scene long after Lilburn's ordeal.
But as far as the trial itself was concerned, by the close of the seven-
teenth century, it came to be the established rule in the common-law
5. 3 How. St. Tr. 1315, 1321 (1637).
6. Id. at 1322.
7. Id. at 1325.
8. Id. at 1326.
9. Id. at 1342.
10. Id. at 1368.
11. 8 WIGmOPn § 2250, at 292.
12. Id. at 294.
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as well as in the ecclesiastical courts that no man was bound to in-
criminate himself on any charge, no matter how the proceedings
against him were instituted-ex officio or otherwise.
13
B. The Development of the Privilege in America.
There is no doubt that the events in England has a profound effect
upon the development of the privilege against self-incrimination in
America. Many colonists came to America for the very purpose
of escaping the kind of persecution epitomized by the Lilburn affair.
Large numbers of American lawyers and judges received their legal
education in England; all looked to English common law as the
foundation of their jurisprudence. But there were other forces at
work in America, possibly sufficient in themselves to account for
the establishment of the privilege in the new world.
Here in America, the colonists had their own bitter experiences
with courts employing inquisitorial methods. The religious zeal
which enabled colonists to brave the uncertainties of emigration in
order to worship God in their own way, often led them to persecute,
here in America, those of their fellows whose mode of worship differed
from their own. In Virginia, for example, the ecclesiastical oath ex
officio, was required and administered well into the seventeenth cen-
tury.14 The supreme colonial courts, composed of the Governor and
Council, also conducted their proceedings in the most extreme in-
quisitorial manner. Such a proceeding was the one instituted in 1689
against William Bradford, who had published the Pennsylvania
charter so as to inform the people of' that colony of their rights.15
Another force at work had its origin on the continent of Europe.
At the time of the American constitutional conventions in the 1780s,
there was strong agitation in France against the inquisitorial fea-
tures of the old regime. Jefferson was in Paris at this time. Wigmore
and Pittman are of the opinion that the French enthusiasm for the
privilege was due to American influence and not vice versa. 16 This
view is given support by the fact that between 1776 and 1784, seven
American states had inserted the privilege against self-incrimination
in their constitutions or Bills of Rights.17 But, "It may well have
been a case of interaction, in which the American impulse was re-
13. Id. at 298.
14. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. Rv. 763, 780 (1935).
15. Id. at 785.
16. 8 WIGMORE § 2250, at 303; Pittman, supra note 14, at 764-65. Contra,
Franklin, The Encyclop6diste Origin and Meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
15 LAW. GumD REv. 41 (1955), which places the origin of the privilege almost
exclusively in French and other continental sources.
17. Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina, all in 1776.
Vermont in 1777, Massachusetts in 1780 and New Hampshire in 1784. The
references are respectively, 2 POORE, UNITED STATES CHARTERS AND CONSTrrU-
TIONS, 1909, 1542, 1 id. 818, 2 id. 1409, 1860, 1 id. 958, 2 id. 1282.
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enforced by the enthusiasm of the French response."'18
In 1791, the privilege against self-incrimination was embodied in
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution: "No person
shall . . .be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." Today, forty-six state constitutions also contain provisions
expressly recognizing the privilege.19
These state constitutional provisions are especially important be-
cause the fifth amendment privilege applies only to the federal gov-
ernment. The fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution does
apply to the states, but neither its "privileges or immunities" nor its
"due process" clauses have been interpreted as including those aspects
of the privilege against self-incrimination which have thus far come
before the Supreme Court of the United States.
20
The various state constitutional provisions vary in phraseology.
Fourteen states have provisions like the federal formulation which
prohibits compelling a person to "be a witness against himself." Four
other methods of stating the privilege have been utilized. The ac-
cused shall not be compelled to "give evidence against himself";
"accuse or furnish evidence against himself"; "testify against him-
self"; "give testimony tending . .. to criminate himself."2'
In this article, the privilege against self-incrimination is treated as
a unitary concept. No special attention is given to variations in phras-
ing among the federal and state constitutional provisions embodying
this concept.22
18. Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment, 24 FoRDiHA L. Rsv. 19,
21-22 (1955).
19. The two states without such constitutional provisions are Iowa and New
Jersey. Both of these states have accorded the privilege statutory recognition.
IOWA CoDE ANN. § 622.14 (1950). N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-5 (1952). The courts
of both states have recognized the privilege as part of their common law.
State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902) (alternate holding); State
v. Zdanowicz, 69 N.J.L. 619, 55 Atl. 743 (1903) (dictum).
20. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937) (dictum);
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (dictum). But see Slochower
v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (violation of due process
to summarily dismiss professor at city college for utilizing the privilege before
a federal congressional committee).
21. 8 WIGMORE § 2252 n.3 (excerpts from the various state constitutions).
22. Professor Wigmore has urged that, in determining the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination, nothing should turn upon variations in
the phrasing of constitutional provisions. 8 WIGMORE § 2252. But see Wells v.
State, 20 Ala. App. 240, 101 So. 624, cert. denied, 211 Ala. 616, 101 So. 626
(1924). In holding that it was error for the trial judge to compel the defendant
to stand up for identification, the court said, "Probably the intention of the
different states in adopting these provisions was the same; and yet, technically,
some give greater protection to a defendant than others, for there is no doubt
that strictly speaking the provision 'No person shall be compelled to testify
against himself,' affords less protection than the others above mentioned.'
Wells v. State, supra at 242, 101 So. at 625. Contra, Note, 1 ALA. L.J. 187
(1926), stating that the conflicting views concerning the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination may be traced to differences in the wording of state
constitutional provisions.
However, the cases concerning the question of when conduct on the part
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C. Comments Upon the History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination.
Glancing back over the long course of history just reviewed, several
factors stand out.
The privilege against self-incrimination came to be formulated in
opposition to attempts to extract from an accused person a statement
concerning his guilt or innocence. The proceedings in which an at-
tempt is made to coerce the statement are judicial in nature. Police
and other law enforcement officers are not involved. Finally, the
use of torture to extract the statement plays no part in the forming
of the privilege. The exclusionary rule concerning coerced con-
fessions has a separate history covering a different period of time.2
The importance of these historical factors in determining the modern
limits of the privilege against self-incrimination will form the basis
of much of the discussion that follows.
of an accused is improperly compelled suggest that the decisions, for the most
part, have turned upon the courts' concepts concerning the privilege against
self-incrimination rather than upon variations in phraseology of state consti-
tutions. For example, the Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Texas and Wash-
ington constitutions all contained self-incrimination provisions like the Ala-
bama provision ("give evidence against himself") when the following cases
were decided contrary to the position taken in Wells v. State: People v. Curran,
286 Ill. 302, 121 N.E. 637 (1918) (defendant required to stand for identification);
State v. Prudhomme, 25 La. Ann. 522 (1873) (defendant required to place his
feet where they could be seen by a witness and the jury); State v. Vincent, 222
N.C. 543, 23 S.E.2d 832 (1943) (defendant required to stand for identification);
Rutherford v. State, 135 Tex. Crin. 530, 121 S.W.2d 342 (1938) (defendant
required to stand and remove glasses); State v. Clark, 156 Wash. 543, 287 Pac.
18 (1930) (defendant required to stand and walk over to witness). None of
these courts placed any special emphasis on, or indeed, even quoted, the
wording of the state constitution. The Washington court referred to the de-
fendant's objection as one that "the court compelled the appellant to be a
witness against himself." State v. Clark, supra at 547, 287 Pac. at 19. A
Louisiana case decided after State v. Prudhomme, held that it was not error
for the trial judge to compel the defendant to stand before the jury to have
her height measured. The court cited with approval Wigmore's view that
nothing should turn upon differences in phraseology in the various state
constitutional provisions for the privilege against self-incrimination. State
v. Roy, 220 La. 1017, 1025, 58 So.2d 323, 326 (1952). The Louisiana constitu-
tional provision was still the same as the Alabama provision referred to in
Wells v. State ("give evidence," LA. CONST. art. I, § 11).
On the other hand, the Georgia court in Blackwell v. State, 67 Ga. 76,
44 Am. Rep. 717 (1881), reached a result similar to that reached in Wells v.
State, but the Georgia constitutional provision was different from the Alabama
one and, in fact, very close to the provision quoted in Wells v. State as sup-
posedly affording less protection to the accused than the Alabama provision.
In Blackwell v. State, it was held error for the trial court to order the defend-
ant to stand up so that a witness could see and describe where defendant's leg
was amputated. At this time, the Georgia constitutional provision concerning
self-incrimination read, "No person shall be compelled to give testimony
tending in any manner to criminate himself." GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-106 (1877).
As a further indication that in practice nothing turns upon the pecullar
wording of a state constitution, South Dakota's constitution phrases the self-
incrimination clause in the "give evidence" form, but its amplifying statute
is in the "witness against himself" form. S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 9; S.D. CoD.
§ 34.2907 (1939).
23. 3 WIGMORE §§ 817-20; 8 WIGmORE § 2266.
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WRITING EXEMPLARS AND VOICE IDENTIFICATION: CASE AUTHORITY
It may be that hard cases make bad law. Nevertheless, before at-
tempting to formulate general rules intended to cover a particular
area of the law, it is always well to review the difficult, borderline
cases in that area. Such a review cannot help but clairfy a person's
thinking on the problem at hand and will afford the rugged terrain
needed to test any shining-new theories that may be stirring to life
in his gray matter.
With this in mind, the writer intends in this section to review and
comment upon the cases which deal with the two questions posed in
the introduction to this article.
1. Can a person be compelled to execute an exemplar of his hand-
writing for use against him in a criminal proceeding?
2. Is it a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination to force
a suspect to speak so that a voice identification may be attempted?
For convenience in treating the case authority, a distinction has been
drawn between judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. The sig-




Police officers investigating a crime force a person, against his will,
to execute a sample of his handwriting for comparison with the writ-
ing on an incriminating document. Does such compulsion violate the
privilege against self-incrimination?
No state court has yet decided a case squarely holding one way
or another on this question. There are numerous cases in which a
suspect has voluntarily executed a sample of his handwriting for in-
vestigating officers.24 Such cases, of course, do not present for de-
24. Keese v. State, 223 Ark. 261, 265 S.W.2d 542 (1954); People v. Smith
113 Cal. App. 2d 416, 248 P.2d 444 (1952); People v. Gormley, 64 Cal. App. 2d
336, 148 P.2d 687 (1944); People v. Whitaker, 127 Cal. App. 370, 15 P.2d 883
(1932); State v. McDermott, 52 Idaho 602, 17 P.2d 343 (1932); Rand v. Ladd,
238 Iowa 380, 26 N.W.2d 107 (1947); State v. Renner, 34 N.M. 154, 279 Pac. 66
(1929); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901); State v. Scott,
63 Ore. 444, 128 Pac. 441 (1912); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803
(1923); Sprouse v. Commonwealth, 81 Va. 374 (1886); State v. Owens, 167
Wash. 283, 9 P.2d 90 (1932); Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 203 N.W. 749
(1925).
A slightly different situation is presented in cases in which the handwriting
sample is obtained by using a document such as a bail bond or handwritten
motion which the defendant has voluntarily executed for his own purposes.
Such exemplars have invariably been held admissible in evidence. Shelton v.
United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 346 U.S. 892 (1953),
motion to vacate dismissal denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955) (handwritten motions
filed by defendant appearing pro se); Reining v. United States, 167 F.2d 362
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 830 (1948) (signature on appearance bond)-
Hartzell v. United States, 72 F.2d 569 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 621
(1934) (signature on bail bond); Williams v. State, 27 Tex. App. 466, 11 S.W.
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cision the question of the privilege. Several such cases, however, do
contain dicta speculating as to what the result would be if such conduct
were coerced.
In a California case,25 decided by the court of appeal for the second
district, the defendant had been convicted of forgery. After his arrest
and while in police custody, the defendant had executed an exemplar
of his handwriting which was subsequently introduced into evidence
at the trial and compared with the alleged forgery. On appeal, the
defense contended that it was error to admit the exemplar in evidence
because there was no showing, either that the defendant had been
warned that it might be used against him, or that it was given volun-
tarily. After noting that such a showing was in fact made, the
court indicated that it was not necessary. Such a showing was neces-
sary only in the case of a confession and writing exemplars were not
confessions. 26 The privilege against self-incrimination was not men-
tioned, apparently because it was not considered applicable. This
is clearly indicated in a subsequent case decided by the same court.27
Another case containing a dictum to the effect that a coerced writ-
ing exemplar is admissible in evidence is State v. Lyle.28 After hold-
ing that it was proper for the trial judge to leave it to the jury to
determine whether the sample of defendant's handwriting obtained
after his arrest was given voluntarily, the court goes on to say:
"Further, whether under the particular issue here joined the defendant
was entitled to invoke the objection that this writing was in the nature
of a confession or of incriminating evidence furnished against himself
is at least doubtful. Where a person's handwriting is in dispute, such
a writing, made post litem motam, is clearly open to the inference that
481 (1889) (defendant's signatures on applications for continuance and for
attachments); Ferguson v. State, 61 Tex. Crim. 152, 136 S.W. 465 (1911)
(signature on appearance bond-signature itself not in evidence, but testimony
of one who witnessed the signing admitted); Hunt v. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 252,
26 S.W. 206 (1894) (signature on application for attachment); see also Lefko-
witz v. United States Attorney, 52 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1931), affd, 285 U.S. 452
(1932) (Signature on request to be released on bail obtained by officer for
undisclosed purpose of using it as writing exemplar-circuit court denies
defendant's motion to suppress. This point not dealt with in Supreme Court
opinion.).
Also to be distinguished are those cases in which the defendant, while in
custody, has written a letter containing incriminating statements, the letter
being intercepted and introduced in evidence against the defendant. Such a
letter is utilized, not as an exemplar of the defendant's handwriting, but for
the incriminating statements found therein. These letters have invariably
been held admissible. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Hall v.
State, 171 Ark. 787, 286 S.W. 1026 (1926); Sanders v. State, 113 Ga. 267, 38 S.E.
841 (1901); State v. Vey, 21 S.D. 612, 114 N.W. 719 (1908); State v. Booker,
68 W. Va. 8, 69 S.E. 295 (1910) (dictum); see also Rose v. State, 124 Tex.
Crim. 377, 62 S.W.2d 121 (1933) (intercepted letter also used as exemplar).
25. People v. Whitaker, 127 Cal. App. 370, 15 P.2d 883 (1932).
26. Id. at 373, 15 P.2d at 884.
27. People v. Harper, 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 252 P.2d 950 (1953) (discussed
at pp. 495-97 infra).
28. 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
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it is a self-serving act rather than a self-incriminating act on the part
of the party whose handwriting is in controversy that it is for that rea-
son, as! a general rule, inadmissible on behalf of the writer."'
In other words, police officers may force the defendant to create a
sample of his handwriting and introduce this sample into evidence for
comparison purposes because the defendant could not so introduce a
writing which he had executed after his arrest. It is submitted that
this is a non sequitur. Under such reasoning, a confession obtained by
means of torture would be admissible because the defendant could not
introduce evidence of statements that he had made after the crime in
which he denied his guilt.
Contrary to the California and South Carolina cases, the New Mexico
Supreme Court has indicated that compelling a defendant, while in
custody before trial, to execute an exemplar of his handwriting, does
violate the privilege against self-incrimination. In the first point of its
opinion in State v. Renner,30 the court commented as follows upon a
defense suggestion that the trial court should have instructed the jury
to consider the exemplars only if it should find that they were made
voluntarily: "Undoubtedly had defendant requested the trial court to
give an instruction of the character suggested above, the court would
have done so, or, upon refusal to do so, appellant could have preserved
his record and assigned error in this court."3'
That the court had the privilege against self-incrimination in mind
when it said this, is demonstrated by the language in which it held
admissible a signature executed by the defendant while on the stand
under cross-examination. "Appellant here argues that the admission
of the signature in evidence was in fact compelling the defendant to
give evidence against himself, because the signature was not volun-
tarily made. The record, however, discloses that the signature was
voluntarily made, therefore our holding under point 1 is equally appli-
cable to the present question and decisive thereof .... "-
In State v. Scott,33 the Supreme Court of Oregon, after deciding that
writing exemplars executed by the defendant while in custody were
made voluntarily, went on to indicate that if such conduct were com-
pelled, the exemplar would be considered in the nature of a coerced
confession and inadmissible.34 The privilege against self-incrimination,
as distinguished from the coerced confession rule, was not mentioned.
Several Texas cases have held it error to admit in evidence a writing
exemplar executed by a suspect while in police custody.35 Each of
29. Id. at 432, 118 S.E. at 812.
30. 34 N.M. 154, 279 Pac. 66 (1929).
31. Id. at 158, 279 Pac. at 67.
32. Id. at 159, 279 Pac. at 68.
33. 63 Ore. 444, 128 Pac. 441 (1912) (decision below reversed on other
grounds).
34. Id. at 449, 128 Pac. at 443.
35. Blackshear v. State, 123. Tex. Crim. 111, 58 S.W.2d 105 (1933); Click v.
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these cases, however, rests upon the fact that the court regarded the
writing exemplar as a "confession" within the meaning of a Texas
statute prohibiting the use of a confession unless voluntarily made in
writing and signed after a proper warning as to the rights of the ac-
cused. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is not
mentioned. There is an indication, however, that even without the
confession statute, compelling an accused to create a sample of his
handwriting would be considered a violation of his privilege against
self-incrimination. In Beachem v. State,36 it was held that compelling
a suspect in custody to speak for identification violated the Texas con-
fession statute. Commenting upon a decision by the Commission of
Appeals that such conduct had violated the suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination, Judge Hawkins, presiding over and writing for the
Court of Criminal Appeals wrote: "That question, [self-incrimination],
under the facts here present, is so closely related and interwoven with
a violation of our statute on confessions (Art. 727, C.C.P.) as to make
both principles of law applicable. The present writer has preferred to
discuss the incident complaine-1 of from the viewpoint of a violation of
said Art. 727.3
7
In State v. Seward,38 a Kansas case, the defendant, a seventeen-year-
old forgery suspect, had executed handwriting exemplars while in
police custody. The court says, "We have concluded that in view of
the age of the defendant, the fact that he was held and questioned
without his family being informed, and that he was not advised of his
right to counsel, and that these specimens of his handwriting might
be used against him all rendered these specimens inadmissible and it
was error for the trial court to permit ... the handwriting expert to
use them in his testimony. '39 The court does not indicate on what
legal principle this conclusion is based. In the section of the opinion
immediately preceding, the court is discussing the coerced confession
rule.
People v. Harper,40 is the state case most nearly in point on whether
or not compelling a suspect while in police custody to create a sample
of his handwriting violates his privilege against self-incrimination.
Police officers had entered the defendants' house without a search
warrant, arrested the defendants and seized a number of "betting
State, 119 Tex. Crim. 118, 44 S.W.2d 992 (1931) (exemplar itself not admitted,
but handwriting expert who had seen it based his testimony on it); Kennison v.
State, 97 Tex. Crim. 154, 260 S.W. 174 (1924).
36. 144 Tex. Crhn. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942); TEX CODE Cnmw. PROC. art.
727 (1925).
37. Id. at 283, 162 S.W.2d at 711. Judge Hawkins also wrote the opinion in
Kennison v. State and was a member of the court approving the opinions of
the Commission of Appeals in Click v. State and Blackshear v. State. See
note 35 supra.
38. 163 Kan. 136, 181 P.2d 478 (1947).
39. Id. at 146, 181 P.2d at 485.
40. 115 Cal. App. 2d 776, 252 P.2d 950 (1953).
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markers" which were used to record bets on horse races. While the
defendants were in custody, the police requested them to execute
handwriting exemplars. The defendants complied, later claiming that
they had done so only because they had been informed that no prose-
cution would be brought. The defendants were prosecuted for book-
making. At trial, the writing samples were utilized for comparison
with the writing on the "betting markers." In affirming the judgment
of conviction, the California Court of Appeal for the second district
stated broadly that the clauses in the California and United States
constitutions embodying the privilege against self-incrimination "only
protect a person from any unwilling testimonial disclosures and do not
preclude the introduction of physical evidence that a defendant is
induced to provide, such as an exemplar of his handwriting .... There
is here no reliance to be placed upon any statement made by either of
the defendants."
41
Was the court correct, however, in stating that no reliance was
placed upon any statement by the defendants? With sufficient practice
and concentration, an expert penman with a knowledge of handwriting
analysis might produce a sample of disguised handwriting which, when
compared with his normal handwriting, would not appear, even to a
qualified expert, to be written by the same person.42 It is submitted,
then, that implicit in the creation of the writing exemplar by the de-
fendants in the Harper case was a statement to the effect that the
exemplars were in their normal or natural handwritings. The police,
in turn, relied on the defendants producing either normal samples, or
ones so clumsily disguised that a competent expert could still identify
them as stemming from the same hands that produced the writing on
the "betting markers." That the reliance in the Harper case was justi-
fied does not mean that there was no reliance.
Moreover, in order to defeat an attempted handwriting identification,
41. Id. at 779, 252 P.2d at 952.
42. In describing a test conducted among members of his university classes,
John J. Harris, a handwriting expert, tells of one student who succeeded "in
completely changing from one natural handwriting to another. He could
.write both a modern commercial system and an individualized form of
Spencerian. This illustrates the great capabilities of a few writers." Harris,
Disguised Handwriting, 43 J. CRnm. L., C. & P.S. 685, 687 (1953).
"It is not suggested that a handwriting cannot be successfully disguised,
but ... to do this ... is a task that is capable of performance by very few
writers indeed." F. BREWSTER, CONTESTED DOCUMENTS AND FORGERIES 113
(1932).
"We do not believe, however, that the movements become so independent
of the will that in forging or deliberately disguising the handwriting, where
attention is preeminently displayed the attention would not be likely to
counteract the effects of habit." WIGMORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PnooF 71
(Ist ed. 1913).
"The difficulties attendant upon the determination of what the writer
could or would do under the operation of the same muscular coordination
when dissimulating, from what was done by the same person when writing
habitually, at times causes the most experienced to grope with the matter pre-
sented as one walking in the dark." HAGAN, DISPUTED HANDWRITING 159 (1894).
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an accused need not be so talented as to be able to successfully disguise
his handwriting. When asked for a sample of his handwriting, the
accused can produce an illegible series of scratches or print in block
letters, 43 claiming that what he has produced is a true sample of his
"handwriting." In such a situation, of course, the police should realize
that the accused is lying.
In short, the creation of a handwriting exemplar is an act involving
the veracity of the accused. He can lie. If he is talented enough to suc-
cessfully disguise his handwriting, he may even deceive the police and
throw them off the trail.
In this respect, handwriting exemplars are to be distinguished from
fingerprints, body markings, blood tests and other examinations of the
body of the accused, the results of which are not within the control of
the accused.4 4
The United States Court of Military Appeals has reached a conclu-
sion contrary to that of the California court. In United States v.
Rosato,45 the defendant, an enlisted man in the United States Army,
had been summoned before an officer who was investigating an alleged
offense. The officer ordered the defendant to print the alphabet. The
defendant refused, stating that he did so on advice of counsel and on
the ground that it would tend to incriminate him. The defendant was
then tried by a general court-martial on the charge of willfully dis-
obeying the lawful command of his superior officer.4 6 He was convicted
and the conviction affirmed by a board of review. The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals reversed this conviction and dismissed the charge, holding
that the order to print the alphabet was in violation of article 31 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice47 and therefore void.
Article 31 reads as follows:
43. 'Ten-lettering in anonymous letters is usually adopted as a disguise
and may be successful if adequate standard writings of the same kind can-
not be obtained." OsBoRN, QUESTIONED DOCUMENT PROBLEMS 140 (2d ed.
1946).
"One of the most difficult of the class of anonymous or disputed writing
to identify is that which is hand-printed, and if it is correctly done, it may be
impossible to fasten its authorship on to any particular person, especially if
similar hand-printed standards are not available for comparison." F. BREws-
TER, CONTESTED DOCUMENTS AND FORGERIES 114-15 (1932).
44. Also to be distinguished are those cases in which the accused is com-
pelled to write, but not in order to obtain a true sample of his handwriting. In
Green Lake County v. Domes, 247 Wis. 90, 18 N.W.2d 348 (1945), the de-
fendant was compelled to write his signature in the presence of the arresting
officer and a physician, as part of a test for intoxication. The court held that
this did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. See
also The King v. Voisin, [19183 1 K.B. 531 (C.A.), where the exemplar was
used, not only as a sample of the defendant's handwriting, but also to de-
termine whether or not he could correctly spell the words "bloody Belgian."
When in such cases, the writing is not used as an exemplar of natural hand-
writing, there is no reliance upon the veracity of the defendant.
45. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1953).
46. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90, 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C.
§ 684 (1952).
47. 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 602 (1952).
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ART. 31. Compulsory self-incrimination prohibited.
(a) No person subject to this code shall compel any person to incrimi-
mate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to
incriminate him.
(b) No person subject to this code shall interrogate, or request any
statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without
first informing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that
he does not have to make any statement regarding the offense of which he
is accused or suspected and that any statement made by him may be used
as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this code shall compel any person to make a
statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the state-
ment or evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article,
or through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement
shall be received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
The court interpreted article 31 as a codification of the privilege
against self-incrimination expressed in the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution:
48
That no person in a criminal case may be compelled to be a witness
against himself is a familiar keystone of our system of justice. From its
origin in the early English common law, it was considered sufficiently
woven into our concept of fundamental liberty to warrant its inclusion in
the Constitution of the United States as the Fifth Amendment .... Dis-
pelling any doubt of its application to the military services, Congress
included the substance of the Fifth Amendment in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, as Article 31 ... .49
The court distinguished the execution of a handwriting exemplar
from other instances of compelled conduct, such as fingerprinting or
an examination for body markings, which are not generally held to be
a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination: "Such instances
do not involve an affirmative conscious act on the part of the individual
affected by the demand. Whereas the printing of the alphabet involves
a conscious exercise of both mind and body, an affirmative action." 50
The Rosato case was followed in United States v. Eggers, 1 decided
'by the same court a few months later. The defendant, suspected of
forgery, had unwillingly created handwriting specimens after he had
been ordered to do so in a pre-trial investigation. It was held error to
have admitted these specimens in evidence. The court based its hold-
48. Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of article 31 give broader protection
than is usually thought to be guaranteed by the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. In United States v. Eggers, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953),
a decision following the Rosato case, the court indicated that it was relying
specifically on paragraph (a) of article 31.
49. 3 U.S.C.M.A. at 144-45, 11 C.M.R. at 144-45.
50. Id. at 147, 11 C.M.R. at 147.
51. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953).
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ing specifically on paragraph (a) of article 31.52
The court again distinguished the handwriting exemplar situation
from other instances of compelled conduct, such as fingerprinting, in
terms of "passive cooperation" involved in the latter as against "active
participation and affirmative conduct" involved in creating a hand-
writing specimen.
53
This distinction seems questionable. Following this reasoning, taking
a blood sample from a person suspected of drunken driving would not
violate the privilege against self-incrimination, but making him walk a
white line would. It is true, of course, that if the active and affirmative
conduct of an unwilling suspect is to be compelled, physical brutality
or threats of such brutality will have to be utilized.M As indicated
above, however,55 the use of torture played no part in the formation
of the privilege against self-incrimination. The exclusionary rule in-
volving coerced confessions had a separate and later history.
Today, a person is protected by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment against the use of evidence secured from him by
state police brutality, even though the evidence does not constitute a
confession or admission.5 6 The due process clause, however, has not
been interpreted as covering those aspects of the privilege against self-
incrimination which have come before the Supreme Court for de-
cision.
57
The privilege against self-incrimination resulted from attempts to
extract from a person's lips a true statement concerning his guilt. It
is urged that the privilege is equally applicable to non-oral disclosures
in which reliance is placed upon the veracity of the accused and which
may aid in proving that he has committed a crime for which he can be
punished.5 8 But there does not seem to be any historical justification
or modern necessity for extending the privilege to compelled conduct
not involving the veracity of the accused. To do so would be needlessly
to make the privilege against self-incrimination a vague and indefinite
52. "Undoubtedly it was the intent of Congress in this division of the
Article to secure to persons subject to the Code the same rights secured to
those of the civilian community under the Fifth Amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United States-no more and no less." Id. at 195, 11 C.M.R. at
195.
53. Id. at 198, 11 C.M.R. at 198.
54. See MAGJmE, EVIDENCE (1947). In discussing the privilege against self-
incrimination, Professor Maguire comments at p. 108: "Do you have any
inclination to contend that a distinction should be taken between non-verbal
disclosures which involve no need to inflict suffering and those which could
only be had from a resolutely resisting person by the use of brutality?"
55. See p. 491 supra.
56. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
57. See p. 490 supra.
58. This is a rule for determining the kind of conduct which, when com-
pelled, may violate the privilege against self-incrimination. There remains
still the question of under what circumstances such conduct must be compelled
in order to violate the privilege. In what forms of extrajudicial proceedings,
if any, may the privilege properly be invoked? This question is discussed at
pp. 508-10 infra.
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constitutional catch-all. The due process clause stands guard ready
to nullify the effects of compulsion that comes "too close to the rack
and the screw."
59
In United States v. Ball,60 however, the Court of Military Appeals
clearly indicated that it was not following this line of reasoning. The
defendant, an army enlisted man, was suspected of the theft of a
treasury check and forgery. After being warned generally, as provided
by article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, that he need not
make any statement regarding the offense and that any statement
made might be used against him, the accused was requested by an
investigating officer to prepare handwriting specimens. The defendant
complied and the exemplars of his handwriting were admitted in evi-
dence at his court-martial. Appealing the conviction, the defense
contended that in addition to the general warning under article 31, the
accused should have been specifically warned of his right not to make
handwriting exemplars. Because this was not done, it was claimed
that the exemplars constituted a "statement" obtained in violation of
article 31 and therefore, according to 31 (d), improperly admitted in
evidence. The Court of Military Appeals rejected this argument and
affirmed the judgment below. It said that a handwriting exemplar is
not a "statement" within the meaning of either 31 (b) or 31 (d) and
therefore no warning at all need be given before an exemplar is re-
quested. It was not a statement, because there was no question of its
truth or falsity, only of the manner in which it was made.61
It is interesting to compare this decision with that made by the same
court in United States v. Taylor.62 While searching the living quarters
of an enlisted man suspected of possessing marijuana cigarettes, the
inspecting officers asked the suspect to point out his own articles of
clothing. The enlisted man indicated, among other items, an overcoat
in which marijuana cigarettes were found. At the subsequent court-
martial, testimony was admitted stating that the defendant had iden-
tified as his own the garment in which the cigarettes were discovered.
The Court of Military Appeals reversed the judgment of conviction on
the ground that the clothing identification by the defendant was a
statement within the meaning of 31 (b) and (d), and therefore the
accused should have been warned of his rights under article 31 before
being asked to make the identification. It is submitted that the same
reasoning is applicable to the making of a handwriting specimen. In
the Taylor case the accused said "this is my coat." In the Ball case he
was saying, "this is my handwriting."63
59. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
60. 6 U.S.C.M.A. 100, 19 C.M.R. 226 (1955).
61. Accord, United States v. McGriff, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 143, 19 C.M.R. 269
(1955).
62. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 178, 17 C.M.R. 178 (1954).
63. Cf. State v. Mayer, 154 Wash. 667, 283 Pac. 195 (1929), holding that
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2. Judicial Compulsion.
The writer has not been able to find any United States case which
squarely decides whether it is a violation of an accused's privilege
against self-incrimination to compel him, in a judicial proceeding, to
execute a sample of his handwriting for comparison with the writing
on an incriminating document.
There are numerous cases in which a defendant has been compelled
on cross-examination to execute such a writing exemplar. But these
cases proceed on the theory that the accused has waived whatever
privilege he might have had by taking the stand and denying that he
executed the incriminating writing.64
In State v. David,65 a Missouri case, the defendant's signature on his
testimony at a coroner's inquest was used for comparison with the
signature on a druggist's poison record. It was held that there was
no error because the defendant's testimony at the inquest had been
one defendant was not entitled to an instruction that no presumption or in-
ference of guilt could be taken from the fact that he failed to take the stand
and testify in his own behalf. The defendant had voluntarily executed hand-
writing exemplars in the presence of the jury and the exemplars were in-
troduced in evidence by the defense. The court said, "Mayer [the defendant],
in legal effect, said to the jury, when he made these samples of his hand-
writing in their presence, 'These are my handwriting,' as plainly as if he
had orally there so told the jury." Id. at 672, 283 Pac. at 197.
The result in Ball also seems contrary to the Texas decisions in which it
was held that a handwriting exemplar was a "confession" within the mean-
ing of the Texas statute making any confession inadmissible which was not
made voluntarily in writing and after a proper warning as to the suspect's
rights. See pp. 494-95 supra.
Cases in which handwriting exemplars executed by the accused during pre-
trial investigation have been held inadmissible in evidence on other than con-
stitutional grounds are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., State v.
Miller, 47 Wis. 530, 3 N.W. 31 (1879), in which it was held that no exemplar
could be admitted in evidence which was not already "in the case" for some
purpose other than handwriting comparison. Accord, Regina v. Aldridge, 3
Fost. & Fin. 781, 176 Eng. Rep. 358 (Nisi Prius 1863).
64. United States v. Mullaney, 32 Fed. 370 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1887); Common-
wealth v. Craig, 19 Pa. Super. 81 (1902); State v. Vroman, 45 S.D. 465, 188
N.W. 746 (1922) (decision below reversed on other grounds); Long v. State,
120 Tex. Crim. 373, 48 S.W.2d 632 (1931) (decision below reversed on other
grounds); Bradford v. People, 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013 (1896) (alternate
holding); State v. Barnard, 176 Minn. 349, 223 N.W. 452 (1929) (alternate
holding); accord, Rex v. Whittaker, 2 West W. Rep. 706, 42 Can. Crim. Cas.
162 (Alberta S. Ct. 1924); see also, Mann v. State, 33 Ala. App. 115, 30 So.2d
462, cert. denied, 249 Ala. 165, 30 So.2d 466 (1947) (held within proper scope
of cross-examination, privilege not mentioned); People v. Klopfer, 61 Cal.
App. 291, 214 Pac. 878 (1923) (defendant had written his name on cross-
examination, held not error for trial judge to order him to write it again
and write it faster); State v. Gordon, 32 N.D. 31, 155 N.W. 59 (1915) (ob-
jection made held not sufficient to raise issue of the privilege). But see Rex v.
Grinder, 11 B.C. 370 (1905) (no indication that defendant on direct examina-
tion had denied making incriminating writing. Cited with disapproval by
Rex v. Whittaker, supra); Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 483 (1937) (in ad-
ministrative investigation, complaining witness cannot be compelled to copy
letters she has denied writing.); People v. Sturman, 209 Mich. 284, 176 N.W.
397 (1920) (dictum) (apparently on theory that exemplar would be extrinsic
evidence); Rex v. Henderson, 18 Can. Crim. Cas. 245 (dictum) (cited with
disapproval by Rex v. Whittaker, supra).
65. 131 Mo. 380, 33 S.W. 28 (1895).
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voluntary. Cox v. State,66 a Texas case involving an exemplar exe-
cuted during a grand jury proceeding, rested on the same ground. In
Bell v. State,67 another Texas case involving a writing sample made
before a grand jury, the decision turned on the defense's failure to
demonstrate that the grand jury proceeding had any reference to the
crime for which the defendant was eventually prosecuted.
The Court of Military Appeals has issued a considered dictum in a
case involving a writing exemplar compelled during trail. In United
States v. Morris68 the defendant was charged with the theft of a watch.
The defendant did not take the stand to testify regarding the merits,
although he did testify on the issue of whether a confession that he had
signed while he was in custody was given voluntarily. The trial counsel
(prosecutor) asked the defendant, who was not on the stand at the
time, to write his signature on a blank piece of paper. A defense ob-
jection that no expert witnesses had been called to make a handwriting
comparison was overruled and the defendant wrote as requested. This
writing was compared with the writing on a pawn ticket. A board of
review disapproved of the court-martial findings of guilty on the
ground that the accused had thus been comi"pelled to incriminate him-
self. The Court of Military Appeals, however, reinstated the sentence.
It cited the Eggers case and stated that it had been error to compel the
accused to write his signature. The objection made was deemed suffi-
cient, under the circumstances, to raise the self-incrimination issue.
But the court held that the error was not prejudicial. The confession,
which was properly admitted in evidence, contained the accused's
signature in eight different places. The compelled signatures were
merely cumulative evidence.
Beltran v. Samson & Jose,69 a case decided in the Philippine Islands,
does present a square holding on the issue of whether a judicially
compelled writing exemplar violates the accused's privilege against
self-incrimination. A provincial official, Jose, petitioned Samson, a
judge, for an order directing Beltran to appear before Jose and take
dictation in his own handwriting. This writing was to be compared
with that in certain forged documents with a view to filing an informa-
tion against Beltran. The order was granted and Beltran petitioned
for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
granted the writ, stating:
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a
similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one
who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both
cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
66. 126 Tex. Crim. 202, 70 S.W.2d 1005 (1934).
67. 99 Tex. Crim. 61, 268 S.W. 168 (1924).
68. 4 U.S.C.M.A. 209, 15 C.M.R. 209 (1954).
69. 53 Phil. 570 (1929).
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And we say that the present case is more serious than that of compelling
the production of documents or chattels, because here the witness is
compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence
which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.7 0
The court did not specifically base its decision on the ground sug-
gested above by the present writer 7l-that the writing exemplar would
constitute a testimonial act in which reliance was placed upon the
veracity of the accused. It should be noted, however, that the reason
why the accused cannot be compelled to furnish an incriminating
document which he rightfully has in his possession in an individual
capacity is that he might, at any time, be required to swear that the
document was authentic. 2 Similarly, a writing exemplar constitutes
an implied statement by an accused that it is his natural handwriting.
B. Voice Identification.
1. Extrajudicial Compulsion.
Is an accused's privilege against self-incrimination violated if, while
he is in custody, police officers compel him to speak so that a witness
may identify his voice?
There have been several cases in which a witness has testified at
trial concerning a voice identification made while the accused was in
custody, but in which the issue of the privilege was not raised by the
defense 3 or in which the speaking was apparently voluntary.7 4
In Beachem v. State,7 5 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
a conviction based upon testimony of a voice identification. The de-
fendant, while in police custody, had been compelled to repeat words
suggested by a robbery victim. The victim thereupon identified the
defendant as the robber. The reversal was based upon a Texas statute
prohibiting the use of a confession, unless made in writing voluntarily
and after a proper warning as to the accused's rights.7 6 Though the
decision, therefore, is not solid authority on the self-incrimination
issue, Judge Hawkins, writing for the court, did indicate that the
privilege might afford an alternate ground for decision.77
70. Id. at 577.
71. See pp. 496-97, 499-500 supra.
72. 8 WIGMORE § 2264, at 364.
73. Wilkins v. State, 29 Ala. App. 349, 197 So. 75, cert. denied, 240 Ala. 52,
197 So. 81 (1940); Orr v. State, 225 Ala. 642, 144 So. 867 (1932) (decision be-
low reversed on other grounds); Mack v. State, 54 Fla. 55, 44 So. 706 (1907).
74. State v. Williams, 245 Iowa 494, 62 N.W.2d 742 (1954) (conflicting evi-
dence as to compulsion); Lenoir v. State, 197 Md. 495, 80 A.2d 3 (1951);
Commonwealth v. Derembeis, 120 Pa. Super. 158, 182 Atl. 85 (1935) (de-
cision below reversed on other grounds).
75. 144 Tex. Crim. 272, 162 S.W.2d 706 (1942).
76. TEx. CODE Calm. PROC. art. 727 (1925).
77. Judge Hawkin's remarks are quoted at p. 495 supra. But see McKee v.
State, 118 Tex. Crim 479, 42 S.W.2d 77 (1931); Briscoe v. State, 106 Tex.
Crim. 402, 292 S.W. 893 (1927); Barnes v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 394, 292 S.W.
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The United States Court of Military Appeals, in United States v.
Noce,7s issued a dictum stating that testimony concerning a voice test
conducted under extrajudicial compulsion is not admissible in evi-
dence. The army wives on a military post had been annoyed by
telephone calls in which their anonymous caller used obscene language.
The defendant, an army enlisted man, was caught in the act of making
one of these calls. The investigating officer who caught the defendant
ordered him to repeat certain words over the telephone. A monitor
on the other end, who had heard the abusive telephone call just com-
pleted, listened to the compelled voice test and identified the defendant
as the anonymous caller. This identification was not referred to during
the subsequent court-martial and no evidence concerning it was
offered. The Court of Military Appeals stated that the order compel-
ling the defendant to speak over the telephone was illegal because it
violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. If evi-
dence concerning this voice test had been offered, it would have been
inadmissible. Since no use had been made of the illegal evidence at
trial, however, the compelled voice test did not taint the conviction
based upon proper evidence.
State v. Taylor,79 a South Carolina case, contains the only clear
holding on the admissibility of evidence concerning a voice test com-
pelled during pre-trial investigation. The defendant was taken into
custody, suspected of having committed rape. He and four other
suspects were lined-up in the police station with their backs to the
rape victim and compelled to repeat certain words which the victim
said her attacker had uttered. At trial, the victim testified that during
this test she recognized the defendant as her attacker, basing her iden-
tification on his voice, size and clothing. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed the conviction on the ground that the voice test in
the police station had violated the defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination. Evidence concerning the test was therefore inadmis-
sible. The court cited as authority State v. Griffin,8 0 in which it was
held error to admit in evidence a sheriff's statement that when he had
asked the defendant to place her foot in a trAck, the defendant re-
sponded by attempting to obliterate the track. The court in the
Griffin case indicated that all evidence concerning the enforced conduct
of a defendant was inadmissible.81
Again it is urged that it is unnecessary and unwise to extend the
privilege against self-incrimination to cover all compelled conduct.8
a
548 (1927), in all of which the defendant apparently spoke voluntarily, but
was not warned as required by the confession statute. These cases are not
cited in the Beachem case.
78. 5 U.S.C.M.A. 715, 19 C.M.R. 11 (1955).
79. 213 S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948).
80. 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81 (1924).
81. Id. at 215-16, 124 S.E. at 86.
82. See pp. 499-500 supra.
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Only compelled conduct which places reliance on the veracity of the
accused and which may aid in convicting him of a crime for which he
can be punished should be within the scope of the privilege.83 It would
seem that a compelled voice test does meet this requirement. As is the
case in the execution of handwriting exemplars, a direction to an
accused to speak for identification purposes implies a command that
he speak in his normal voice. When the accused speaks, he is making
the statement, "This is my voice." Since, in practice, voice identifica-
tions are usually made by inexpert laymen, the suspect who disguises
his voice has an even greater chance of defeating identification that
the suspect who attempts to disguise his handwriting.
2. Judicial Compulsion.
The writer has not found a case decided by any state appellate court
which decides whether it is a violation of an accused's privilege against
self-incrimination to compel him to speak for identification during a
judicial proceeding.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly left the question open
in Johnson v. Commonwealth.84 While the defendant was on trial for
murder, the district attorney asked him to stand up and repeat certain
words. A witness, then on the stand, had testified that the murderer
had uttered these words on the night of the crime. The defendant
promptly complied without any objection being made. The court
decided that this constituted a waiver of any possible objection. Judge
Sterrett, the writer of the opinion, however, indicated that he believed
the rights of the accused would not have been violated even if a timely
objection had been made:
He was not asked, much less compelled, "to give evidence against himself."
... To hold that this was a violation of the clause in section 9 of the
declaration of rights which declares the accused "cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself," would, in my judgment, be a strained
construction of that instrument. If it should be sanctioned, what would
prevent a person accused of having stolen property in his possession from
successfully interposing a like plea of constitutional immunity, and thus
thwarting any attempt to search for and recover the property? 85
It is suggested that this is a non sequitur. There is a world of dif-
ference between compelling an accused to make a true statement
concerning an incriminating fact (the natural sound of his voice) and
conducting a search under proper authority. Searching a suspect's
83. The reader is reminded again that this is a test for determining the
type of compelled conduct which is capable of violating the privilege.
Whether the privilege is applicable, even to this type of compelled conduct,
in all manner of proceedings, judicial or otherwise, is another question and is
discussed at pp. 508-10 infra.
84. 115 Pa. 369, 9 Atl. 78 (1887).
85. Id. at 395, 9 Atl. at 81.
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house does not require any testimonial utterance on his part.86
The United States Court of Military Appeals has passed upon the
question of a judicially compelled voice test. In United States v.
Greer,87 the defendant was accused of assault with a dangerous
weapon. At trial, the prosecutor asked the accused to read a sentence
from the Manual for Courts-Martial so that the victim of the assault
might make a voice identification. Over objection by the defense
counsel, the accused was required to read as requested. The Court of
Military Appeals ordered a rehearing on the ground that the accused
had been deprived of his privilege against self-incrimination as em-
bodied in article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice and cited
as authority the Rosato and Eggers cases.88
CONCLUSIONS AM SUGGESTIONS
Having reviewed some of the more difficult cases involving com-
pelled conduct, an attempt will now be made to state some conclusions
and offer some suggestions concerning the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Determining what an accused person can be compelled to do, with-
out violating his privilege against self-incrimination, involves, it is
suggested, two basic problems. First, it must be decided what conduct
may be within the scope of the privilege. Then, it is necessary to
indicate whether compelling such conduct will always violate the
privilege. Or is the privilege applicable only under certain circum-
stances in certain forms of proceedings?
A. Conduct That May be Within the Scope of the Privilege.
As indicated in the above discussion, the present writer suggests
that the privilege against self-incrimination may apply to any state-
ment which an accused person is compelled to make and concerning
which reliance is placed upon his veracity. (This assumes, of course,
that the statement may aid in proving that the accused committed a
crime for which he can be punished.) In other words, the privilege
may apply to any compelled conduct which the accused "can so control
as to use it as a means of conveying ideas."8 9 Conduct which the
86. Commonwealth v. Valeroso, 273 Pa. 213, 116 Ati. 828 (1922), decided
that a trial judge erred in permitting the district attorney, in open court
and before the jury, to ask the defendant to produce a letter. The court
quoted the dictum in the Johnson case and said, "While we do not pass upon
the precise question in that case now, yet the question we are considering bears
a close analogy to it." Id. at 221, 116 Atl. at 831.
87. 3 U.S.C.M.A. 576, 13 C.M.R. 132 (1953).
88. Discussed pp. 497-500 supra.
89. MORGAN & MAGUIRE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 449 n.25 (1951).
This is not to be taken to mean that a statement compelled while the accused
is under the influence of certain drugs or strapped to a lie detector cannot
violate the privilege. Under such circumstances, reliance is still placed upon
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accused cannot so control does not, no matter how or when compelled,
violate the privilege.90
This rule finds support in the historical development of the privilege
against self-incrimination. The privilege grew out of attempts to force
a person to tell the truth about an alleged offense and thereby supply
the needed proof against himself. Nowhere in this long history, is
there found the suggestion that conduct not involving the veracity of
the accused may be within the scope of the privilege.
The policy justifying the existence of the privilege also lends support
to this concept. The basic reason justifying the availability of the
privilege to an accused person is stated by Wigmore as follows: "The
real objection is that any system of administration which permits the
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source
of proof must itself suffer morally thereby. The inclination develops
to rely mainly upon such evidence, and to be satisfied with an incom-
plete investigation of the other sources." 91
A conviction based upon statements made by the accused will al-
ways raise questions as to why the accused made the statements. Was
he really guilty? Was he taking the blame for someone else? Was he
so frightened that he was willing to say anything? On the other hand,
requiring the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in
open court, using evidence not dependent upon the veracity of the
accused, gives to the verdict a persuasiveness and a moral force that
it could not otherwise have.
Now this does not seem to apply directly to writing exemplars and
voice identification. It might be claimed that the instances in which
a man could successfully imitate the handwriting or voice of another,
even if he wanted to, would be too rare to make anything turn upon
the accused's veracity. In fact, measures have been taken to insure this
veracity.
Another way of treating the "truth serum"-ie detector problem is to
say that such devices involve probing the contents of the accused's mind.
Such probing of the private thoughts of an individual is detestable and con-
stitutes a violation of the privilegd against self-incrimination.
The writer has no quarrel with this "right of privacy" rationale of the
privilege against self-incrimination, except as it may exclude writing ex-
emplars and voice identification tests from the scope of the privilege. Such ex-
clusion is not necessary, however, even under this rationale. When an ac-
cused is requested to project his mental image of his natural handwriting
or voice, the contents of his mind are being probed. It is suggested that
whenever an accused is compelled to make a statement involving his
veracity, the contents of his mind are being probed and the two tests, though
stated in different words, are really the same.
90. This rule would exclude from the scope of the privilege fingerprinting,
taking of foot or shoe impressions, examination for body markings, trying
on clothing, taking blood tests and making other physical examinations-
in short, the kind of conduct which will result in the production of "real"
evidence. Whether such conduct will violate other constitutional provisions,
such as the due process clause, or whether it will result in evidence that will
be inadmissible because of low credibility or because it violates some other
rule of evidence, is another matter and beyond the scope of this article.
91. 8 WiGMoam § 2251, at 309.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
them. But there is another factor. A guilty person may be ordered
to tell the truth, to speak in his natural voice or write in his normal
handwriting, but there is no assurance that he will do so. In fact, the
expectation is that he will lie if he realizes that he can. Then what is
the use of a rule which would punish a person for not telling the truth,
not speaking or writing normally, under such circumstances? If he
lies, the proof acquired is worthless. If an attempt is then made to
punish him for lying, resort will have to be made to proof which could
have been used in the first place. That is, in order to prove that the
accused has lied, it will be necessary, either to produce specimens of
his natural voice or handwriting, or to call on a witness who is familiar
with the accused's voice or handwriting and who can now testify that
what the accused has produced was not done in a normal manner.
Specimens so produced could have been used in the first place. Testi-
mony of a witness familiar with the accused's handwriting, likewise,
could have been employed directly to determine whether the incrimi-
nating document in question was in the accused's handwriting. Of
course, testimony by one witness concerning the accused's natural
voice will not enable another witness to make a voice identification.
If such testimony is used to punish the accused for failure to speak
normally, the investigatory process will have made a criminal, not
aided in the solution of a crime.92
B. Proceedings in Which the Privilege May Be Invoked.
This last consideration brings us to the second basic problem in
setting the limits of the privilege against self-incrimination as it con-
cerns the compelled conduct of an accused. Given that the accused
is compelled to make a statement in which reliance is placed upon
his veracity and which may aid in proving that he has committed a
crime for which he can be punished, under what circumstances will
this violate his privilege against self-incrimination?
It is suggested that the privilege against self-incrimination is not
involved unless the accused can legally be punished in some manner
for failing to make a true statement. The most obvious instance is that
of a person testifying under oath. If he makes a false statement, he
may be punished for perjury. If he refuses to make any statement at
all, and if the privilege does not apply, he may be punished for
contempt.
But the privilege should be available to anyone in danger of being
legally punished for refusing to make a true statement that might
92. This argument is also applicable to some extent to testimony by a per-
son ordered to testify under an immunity statute which provides penalties
for perjury. The expectation that such a person will lie, however, is less
than it would be if the true statements he makes might be used to convict him
of a crime for which he could be punished.
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incriminate him, not just to persons testifying under oath. A soldier,
ordered by his superior officer to execute a handwriting exemplar,
or to speak for identification, should be protected by the privilege
from prosecution for failure to obey the order. A civilian should be
able to invoke the privilege against a statute which requires, for
instance, that all persons charged with forgery, execute, upon request,
specimens of their natural handwriting, and which provides criminal
penalties for refusal. A statement made under such an order or such
a statute would be the equivalent of testimony under oath. If the
accused refused to make any statement, he could be punished. If it
could be demonstrated that a statement he did make was false, he
could be punished for non-compliance with the order or statute,
though not for perjury, if no oath had been administered.
If, after pleading the privilege, an accused involuntarily makes a
statement under, such an order or statute, because he fears the legal
penalties of refusal, his statement should be treated the same as
evidence given by an accused on the witness stand after his plea of
the privilege against self-incrimination has been improperly over-
ruled.
93
But what of the ordinary police investigation? Suppose a suspect
is compelled by police to make an incriminating statement. lie could
not have been legally punished if he had refused to talk, but he made
the statement because he was hurt, or afraid, or both. Does the
privilege against self-incrimination prevent that statement from being
used against the suspect in a subsequent criminal prosecution?
There is no historical justification for extending the privilege into
this area. The privilege was developed in order to protect persons
from legal punishment for refusal to make incriminating statements.
John Lilburn, who suffered the birth pains of the privilege, suffered
them under legal sentence.
Professor Morgan has urged that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion should be available in the ordinary police investigation: "The
function which the police have assumed in interrogating an accused
is exactly that of the early committing magistrates, and the oppor-
tunities for imposition and abuse are fraught with much greater
danger."
94
This examination of accused felons by the committing magistrates,
93. "[If. .. a trial judge improperly compels a witness to testify by over-
ruling the latter's claim of privilege against self-incrimination, the evidence
thus extracted may not normally be used against the witness in a sub-
sequent proceeding, but he is not immunized from prosecution for crim-
inality revealed in that testimony. This qualified protection seems sufficient,
for the witness under these circumstances might resolutely refuse to testify in
the first instance, and obtain freedom by habeas corpus if committed for
contempt." MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE 112-13 (1947).
94. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MIN. L. REV. 1,
27 (1949).
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however, continued long after the Lilburn affair and the establishment
of the privilege against self-incrimination in England. Not until 1848
was a statute passed requiring that the accused be warned that he
did not have to answer the magistrate's questions.95 This statute seems
more properly a step in the relatively late development of the exclu-
sionary rules concerning coerced confessions than in the development
of the earlier privilege against self-incrimination. Certainly extra-
judicial interrogation involving various forms of compulsion played
no part in the formation of the privilege. The coerced confession rule,
which deals with such extrajudicial interrogations, was developed
independently of and at a substantially later date than the privilege
against self-incrimination. 96
If, then, an accused is to be protected from incriminating statements
made during an ordinary police investigation, the protection should be
accorded by considering any such statement an admission and expand-
ing, in jurisdictions where expansion is necessary, the exclusionary
rules governing coerced confessions to cover such admissions. It is
unnecessary to accord such protection by forcing the privilege against
self-incrimination into an area where it was never intended to and
never has operated. It is unwise because such extension of the privi-
lege beyond its historical and logical bases will make it even more
vulnerable to the attacks of its critics and, in the end, serve only to
weaken it.
The privilege against self-incrimination should, however, protect
any person who, compelled by the threat of legal punishment, makes
a statement in which reliance is placed upon his veracity and which
may be used to convict him of a crime for which he can be punished.
Such an interpretation of the privilege seems fully in accord with
its history97 and policy and, it is suggested, is the minimal one neces-
sary for its effective operation.98
The personal liberties that we cherish are fragile entities. They
survive because they are protectively encased in a stout bundle of
95. 11 & 12 VICT., c. 42, § 18 (1848).
96. 3 WIGMORE §§ 817-20; 8 WIGMORE § 2266.
97. Contra, Pittman, The Fifth Amendment, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956). Mr.
Pittman argues that, if the privilege is given its correct historical interpreta-
tion, it will be limited to actual criminal cases tried in court.
98. But what of cases holding that an official of a corporation or other
organization can not successfully invoke the privilege when ordered to pro-
duce records of the organization? E.g., United States v. White 322 U.S. 694
(1944). These cases might be considered as an exception to tle rule stated
above. The present writer suggests that they are explainable on a waiver
theory, like cases involving statutes that require certain records to be kept
(e.g. narcotic records) or that certain information be made available by a
person involved in an automobile accident. See Commonwealth v. Joyce,
326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192 (1951), involving a hit-and-run statute, in which
the court discusses the waiver theory, but says, "We prefer to rest our de-
cision on the ground that the tendency of the required information to in-
criminate the defendant is too remote to form the basis for a claim of
privilege." Id. at 756, 97 N.E.2d at 196.
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sticks-our constitutional rights and privileges. Remove one stick
and then another because this bundle seems too bulky, too heavy to
use for some purpose of the moment, and the bundle will soon become
thin enough to be cracked over the knee of any petty tyrant who
chances to local or national authority.

